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Humanness as Colonial Systems
Jaana Porra; jaana@uhupvm1.uh.edu; University of Southern California
Introduction
According to the theory of systems, during the past two thousand years, only two ways of describing
systems have been adopted widely enough to be called paradigms (Kuhn, 1970; Klir, 1972). The
mechanistic paradigm of hierarchies of timeless, and context independent structures has roots as old as
Plato (Mayr, 1982). The organic paradigm originated with the computer (von Bertalanffy, 1968). This
paradigm is based on a simple input-process-output-feedback loop which adapts according to
Darwinian/Spencerian, continuous, and gradual evolution (Darwin, 1979; Mayr, 1982). The two abstracted
systems models have been adopted by the IS field to the extent that it can be claimed that the notion IS is
mechanistic or organic by nature (Porra, 1996). This means that the current IS literature has very little
human-like qualities unless it is accepted that humanness is like a machine (Porra, 1996). In this paper the
author poses the question of humanness in relation to the two current systems paradigms (and the current
notions of IS). An alternative systems model is proposed called colonial systems to be considered as the
premise for more human information systems.

The concept of humanness
Humanness is a nebulous term. It has been defined in a variety of ways in several fields. For example,
humanness has been said to be metaphysical and beyond the reach of the scientific method (Giddens and
Turner, 1987). It has been said to exist in the hearts and minds of people (Geertz, 1973). Humanness has
been said to differ from other organic life in that it has culture (Geertz, 1973). It has been held that
humanness differs from machines in that it has intuition, instinct, creativity and reasoning power (Dreyfus
and Dreyfus, 1986). Fields such as social theory, cultural anthropology and artificial intelligence have all
attempted to distinguish humanness by expressing what it is not. This way of antithesis helps us to
understand the boundaries of the problem. It does not, however, create alternative systemic axioms
comparable to mechanistic systems or organic systems -- the only two ways of describing humanness as
systems available today.

Humanness as Heideggerian being-in-time
In order to create more human systems theoretical foundations, the author chose Martin Heidegger's
existential philosophy view as a starting point. Heidegger describes humanness (Dasein's kind of Being) as
a phenomenon of the kind of context dependence in historical time which denies the closure required for
objects or subjects (Heidegger, 1962). According to him, the human kind of being-in-time "is" in
primordial (historical) time. This means that humanness is influenced by other human beings and the
nonliving environment in a profound way throughout its history. Moreover, this evolution through contexts
and time is used by the system for extraordinary change. The author adopts this Heideggerian viewpoint as
humanness. She hypothesizes that the system of humanness is demonstrable on a systems continuum called
being-in-time (Porra, 1996). It can be hypothesized that the humanness Heidegger refers to is a real system
in that it objectively exists. Moreover, its existence through its own history is the only source of
humanness.
When the systems continuum is used to illustrate the mechanistic and organic paradigms, the problem
becomes apparent (c.f., Porra, 1996). Mechanistic and organic systems are comparable to "things." They
consist of no being-in-time (mechanistic systems) and a relatively modest amount of being-in-time (organic
systems). On the systems continuum of being-in-time they reside to the left of more human systems. Both
mechanistic and organic systems allow the closure required for objectification (or subjectification).
Therefore, they cannot serve as the systems foundations for humanness.

Humanness in nature

Heidegger points out "existence" as the primary source of humanness (Heidegger, 1962). Existence is
another way of saying "self" (Parks and Steinberg, 1979). Self, on the other hand, is a form of "life" (Mayr,
1992). The author proposes that to explain human systems, humanness has to be explained as a living
system -- which is beyond the mechanistic and organic paradigms since humanness requires open
endedness not previously described as a system. The author assumes that humanness is a form of life at a
level of "nonclosed" systems in nature (Porra, 1996). In nature, these kinds of systems are known to occur
at the level of species (Eldredge and Gould, 1972).
Referring to a "living system" as the systems premise for humanness is problematic. Today, we do not
know what "life" is. There is no substance or force which could be identified as life (Mayr, 1982). The only
aspect which is known about life is that it evolves. This means that what life is today is a product of its own
history (Mayr, 1982). In systems theoretical sense, it can be said that life in general and the human kind of
life in particular is a system of some kind. This is because anything can be called a system (Klir, 1985). Of
the two existing ways of describing systems, the mechanistic paradigm has to be rejected because it
recognizes no evolution. Since Heideggerian being-in-time rejects objectification as the premise for human
systems axioms, organic evolution as described by Darwinian/Spencerian, progressive, gradual, adaptive
and continuous development also does not apply. No systems paradigm exists for the axioms of humanness.
The author proposes that humanness is more like a species than it is a simple mechanical machine or a
computer-like organism in that a species has no definite closure. This means that humanness may evolve
like a species does. An alternative model for evolution which is potentially more suitable for explaining the
evolution of humanness than the current systems paradigms, is found in Eldredge and Gould (1972). Their
model of punctuated equilibrium defines the mode of evolution for species, and as the author proposes, for
humanness. The author calls the system of humanness which evolves as a species level system a colonial
system (see figure below) (Porra, 1996).

Humanness as colonial systems
Colonies in nature occur at the species level. The strength (weakness) of animal and plant colonies is
defined by the degree to which the participating animals or plants are like (distinct from) one another
(Banta, 1987). This definition can loosely be adopted to describe humanness as a colonial system of
Heideggerian being-in-time. As a species level system, a colonial system evolves (phylogeny) through
stasis (meaningless fluctuation) and violent punctuations (radical change) as described by Eldredge and
Gould (1972). Since a colonial system occurs at the species level, it has no lifetime (ontogeny). At this
level, the lifetimes of organisms do not apply. Moreover, because humanness is not a thing, it has no
definite boundaries. Instead, it is influenced by its context through fuzzy boundaries which allow a
wholistic influence of context (other human beings, organic life, and things) on the colonial system.
Potentially everything the human system has ever evolved through is in the system as a part of its
humanness. Since every system evolves through a unique path of experiences, by definition, each colonial
system is different from every other. As a colonial system, humanness is: diverse; intimately involved with
its context; and an extremely "change able" system.

Since a colonial system is not a thing, it is not bound by the laws of complexity or structure in a similar
way to objects. Its ability to change its size (growth) in radical shifts introduces a system which can alter its
complexity and structure at will. Because of its history, a colonial system is a relatively independently
operating unit which chooses its goals and the ways to achieve them. The history of the system is the
sufficient and only source for the system to achieve its own objectives. The history of the colonial system is
also the source of nearly complete endogenous power. As a colonial system humanness is emancipated by
definition.
In a colonial system, endogenous power means that every colonial system holds complete power over itself
and no power over its environment. This is true even when the system decides to surrender authority over
itself to its environment. Thus, a colonial system can retain the power over itself at any time. The unique
nature of an emancipated colonial system is that it complements adaptive qualities (feedback) with an
effective feedforward (control) mechanism. A colonial system is the only known system which uses
feedback only as a corrective device assisting its proactive long term goal setting. Although humanness as a
colonial system enjoys relative freedom from its environment to change in unforeseen and unexplained
ways, it is always bound by its own existence (evolutionary history); its current environment; and to some
extent, its current microlevel structure (biology). Colonial systems describe humanness as a relatively free
agent when viewed from the levels of systems assumptions. In a colonial system of humanness, this
freedom is a product of the history of the system.

Colonial systems and IS research
If it is accepted that humanness is colonial by nature, the current IS research literature does not address
humanness (Porra, 1996). It is mainly based on the mechanistic and organic systems premises. The field
describes an ahistorical IS which has no evolution. Rather, it adapts to its environment during its alleged
lifetime in an ambiguously defined evolutionary context (c.f., Nolan, 1973; Lyytinen, 1987; Budde et.al.,
1992; Ein-Dor and Segev 1993). This kind of IS has relatively fixed boundaries with controlled access
points (environment variables) (c.f., Ives, Hamilton and Davis, 1980).
Information systems have grown in complexity (c.f., Hirschheim, et.al., 1996). Moreover, every individual
IS grows in size and in complexity until mature. Beyond the change curve characterized by the life-cycle
model, the nature of change in IS's and the relation of this change to the change of the organization is
largely unknown (c.f., Markus and Robey, 1988). What is implemented in the IS is determined by the
power exercised in the IS design process. This power is mostly exogenous and in the hands of those who
hold power in the formal organization (c.f. Orlikowski and Robey, 1991). Currently, the IS development
process is analogous to a product development cycle (c.f., Budde et.al., 1984) in a mechanistic organization
(Melcher, 1975). In summary, the current IS literature emphasizes organizational control through
automation of simplified, objectified tasks. Such an exercise has nearly nothing to do with humanness as
defined by Heideggerian being-in-time. Instead, it is an example of mechanistic thinking more familiar
from Taylorism. An IS is a thing.

Conclusion
This paper has shortly illustrated how philosophy can be used to reflect the status of IS research.
Particularly, existential philosophy has been used as a way of pointing toward more human theoretical
foundations for IS research at the axiomatic level. If it is accepted that humanness is colonial by nature,
humanness is currently out of the reach of the IS community. If more human IS's are accepted as the
purpose of the IS design (c.f., Mumford, 1990), this paper calls attention to what is implemented in
computer based IS's instead of humanness. More seriously, what is the potential impact of accepting simple
machines (be they mechanistic or organic) as a foundation instead of humanness? The long term impact of
such a choice is the main concern. It is the author's conviction that the question of the nature of humanness
is the most important question for the field of IS research to raise. This is because it is the discipline most
intimately involved in designing human computer based systems.
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